Human perceptions of risk: interesting article

[kwmoore]

Click here. (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1562978-1,00.html)

I have often wondered about this in relationship to a number of risks in flying, for example mid-air collision. The numbers say that this is one of the least probable events in aviation. Nonetheless some folks spend $20+K on Skywatch or other similar technologies to reduce an already minuscule risk of harm, yet squirm about a few 100 bucks for additional training that arguably would make their flying far safer. Technology or no, the main risks remain (a) flying into weather conditions that the pilot and/or airplane can't handle, (b) fuel mismanagement, and (c) low-level maneuvering in all the wrong places. :rolleyes:

The human brain is weird at times!

[nworth]

The crux of it is control of the risk and, I think, a few experiences with near misses.

With the ink still wet on my temporary PPL, while flying in the pattern at an uncontrolled airport, concientiously making my CTAF reports and checking outside, I look to the right on left downwind and here comes a 150 aimed straight for the co-pilot door. I dive, he turns, we both barely survive. I was flying in a plane with a TIS system installed but I was too far away (and too low) to receive the traffic reports.

Just recently, I departed from Sarasota, this time in a plane with no traffic system at all, enroute to the practice area to practice some maneuvers. Tampa departure had me and I was anxious to get started so I requested "squawk vfr" a little sooner than usual. They accepted my request and (I swear) no less than 20 seconds later, two fighter jets fly over doing 250 kts no more than 350 feet above. Why they weren't playing in the MOA 40 miles east, I don't know, but it was clear that Tampa Departure wasn't paying attention that day.

If you get a TCAS system, you will be astonished how many planes are in the air. And close. And invisible. (Frankly, seeing all those yellow and red symbols on the screen may ADD to your anxiety re. midair collisions). However, if you have a few experiences like mine, you won't consider one of those things a luxury at all.

By the numbers, it may not be rational, but I feel I can control risks like CFIT, (untrained) VFR into IMC, fuel mismanagement (an amazing one to me), flight into convection and high turbulence (with a satellite WX system) and low-level maneuvering (though to be fair, this category of accident isn't just hot-dogging; regular stall-spin accidents are lumped in there too).

On the other hand, other than looking out the window, and maybe always filing IFR or asking for flight following, there's little I can do to inoculate myself from idiot pilots who don't announce at uncontrolled airports or enter the pattern on the 45. That's why I put the Ryan in my plane and I'm really glad I did.

The parachute falls into the much the same category. Especially in the 260se, which can be landed so slow that an immediate crash into a concrete wall is likely still survivable, there are only a very few (and rare) circumstances where one would need the chute. However, all those circumstances are ones outside my control and they are all 100% deadly. For those reasons, and that the chute goes a long to (irrationally) calming anxious passengers, I am pleased that Todd is, this very moment, installing mine....

[nworth]

I posted my first comments without reading the article you linked. It points out the common fallacies of human risk assessment, particularly as it relates to public policy.

This is one of my top bugaboos. It's amazing to me the stupid public policy that arises from reaction to a single, tragic perhaps, but statistically irrelevant, event. Comment on this, however, belongs in a political forum.

With regard to aviation, this issue was posited as either/or. That is, don't spend the 20k on a TCAS system. Rather, go up for some recurrent training or sign up for Simcom or Flight Safety. That's a good point but, really, the best answer is to do both.

[nworth]

While I am on this topic, I wanted to comment on the oft-quoted "statistic" that 70-something % of all aviation accidents are caused by pilot error. A fair number of the reports, however, seem to me to pin the blame on pilots when either the data don't squarely show some other cause or because that's the default conclusion.

A large number of the reports I read say something like this (I am exaggerating for effect):

-----
Incident Report
Wing fell off airplane at 3000 AGL. Pilot attempted to regain control but plane spiraled in and stuck ground.

Cause of Accident
Pilot failure to maintain control resulting in fatal crash. Pilot error.
-----

I'm not kidding. I've seen accidents chalked up as "pilot error" after gear collapses and unforecast wind shear events on landing. Seems a little unfair....

[kwmoore]

Nonetheless some folks spend $20+K on Skywatch or other similar technologies to reduce an already minuscule risk of harm, yet squirm about a few 100 bucks for additional training that arguably would make their flying far safer.

I hope I didn't imply that TCAS is not worthwhile. I like having it too, although sometimes I think it unnecessarily elevates my (and passengers') tension levels for "targets" that aren't really a threat at all given their position and motion relative to me.

My point was the seeming disconnect exhibited by some pilots between spending a large sum on this technology yet being less willing to spend significantly lesser sums on additional training, which is arguably a lot more effective in reducing the most significant risks (statistically speaking) in their flying.

I think that people in general confuse "risks" with "consequences" and tend to be preoccupied with events that are low risk but entail severe consequences. A mid-air is one example of a low risk but high consequence event. Norm is correct that CFIT, weather, fuel mismanagement etc. are under the pilot's control and should in principle be reducible to very low risk items too (training!). However they continue to be the main killers of pilots, even in Technologically Advanced Aircraft.